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China, The United States and Global Warming:
A Planetary Prisoners’ Dilemma
Philip S. Golub and Jean-Paul Maréchal1
Abstract:
The paper examines some key economic dimensions and the international relations
implications of the last question posed in the call for papers: “Given that China and the
United States are the largest national sources of gas pollution, albeit with very different
capabilities and historical responsibilities, how might they work together to protect the
atmospheric commons?”
1. The Trap
The first part of the paper is dedicated to some structural aspects – logical and empirical - of
the decision making framework generated by American and Chinese important levels of GHG
emissions.
The logical aspect of the question can be grasped through the notion of “prisoners’ dilemma”.
This notion permits to highlight the fact that both China and the United States are confronted
to a contradiction between their short-term and long-term interests.
The empirical aspect of the question is put into evidence by the fact that the environmental
Kuznets’ curve… does not exist. In other words it is useless to expect that an increase in the
GDP per capita of a national economy would lead, above a certain threshold, to an automatic
betterment of the quality of the environment.
2. Solving the Dilemma
The second part examines fundamental debates concerning the burden sharing (between the
US and China) of global warming mitigation. These debates concern both the economic
instruments and practical implementation.
Carbon taxation and “cap and trade” pose three kinds of questions, at international and
domestic levels. The first deals with the “where equity requirement”, i.e. the best way to
reduce GHG emissions at the lowest marginal cost. The second deals with the best indicators
to define the obligation of each country. The third relates to the domestic level: how to spread
the burden between social groups?
3. Forging International Cooperation.
Since shared meanings (in Michael Walzer’ sense) need time to change and as the
procrastination penalty in the field of global warming is very high, the last part of the paper
examines trust-building mechanisms between the US and China, and the larger issue of
cooperation under conditions of rising domestic constraints.
Governments seek in crisis circumstances to find short-term solutions to pressing social and
economic problems, and to transfer adjustment costs to others. This accentuates rivalry and
fragmentation at international level. The intellectual and normative challenge is to imagine
new forms of pluralist cooperation leading to convergence around common global agendas
that are in the overall human interest.
In an article published in November 2008, “Science: The Coming Century”, Martin
Rees writes that if the science of climate change is intricate, it is “straightforward compared
to the economics and politics” (Rees 2008: 41). Indeed, global warming poses a unique nexus
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of economic, political and philosophical challenges — a “perfect moral storm” (Gardiner
2006: 397) — for at least three reasons. First, its causes are globally dispersed and its effects
are non-localized. Simply put, driving a car in Paris has no more effect in France than in
Hong Kong, and vice versa. Second, the mean lifetime of fossil fuel CO2 ranging between 30
to 35 thousand years, there is a very long time lag before the natural carbon cycle neutralizes
the anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases (GHG). (Archer 2005: 5) The effects on sea
levels of driving a car today will become manifest only in a couple of decades. Consequently,
we have to consider the problem of justice both on the intragenerational level (between
individuals, nations and social groups today) and on the intergenerational one (between
persons, groups etc. living in different periods of time). Last but not least, our “theoretical
ineptitude” makes it difficult to solve the problems at hand. As Stephen Gardiner aptly points
out, “we are extremely ill-equipped to deal with many problems characteristic of the longterm future. Even our best theories face basic and often severe difficulties addressing basic
issues such as scientific uncertainty, intergenerational equity, contingent persons, nonhuman
animals and nature”. (Gardiner 2006: 407)
The facts on which our judgments should be based are well known and well
established. Expressed as a global average, surface temperatures have increased by more than
0.70°C over the past century. The rate of temperature change has also accelerated. During the
last 50 years the rate of increase was 0.13°C per decade, or twice what had been observed
during the previous century, and has accelerated over the past two decades. (OECD 2008:
141-143) The “linear” consequences of these temperature changes include the decline in
snow pack and ice cap coverage, the retreat of glaciers, increasingly frequent extreme wet
and dry weather events, the proliferation of pathogenic agents and so on. “Non-linear”
consequences include, for instance, the disturbance of deep-ocean circulation or abrupt
collapses of ecosystems. The third IPCC report (2001) leaves no doubt about the causes of
these modifications: “There is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed
over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities”. In fact, it is caused by the emissions
of gases such as carbon dioxide and methane gases, to cite the most important ones, which
are included in the “GHG” category. Carbon dioxide concentration, which has risen 20 parts
per million (ppm) during the last 8,000 years, rose from 280 to 379 ppm during the twentieth
century. Atmospheric carbon dioxide and methane concentrations are now higher than at any
time during the last 650,000 years.
These transformations threaten the human prospect. In the absence of decisions today,
the effects sketched above will at the very least inhibit human development and might in fact
generate truly catastrophic systemic outcomes in future. By upsetting the balance of the
ecosystem, anthropogenic interference with the climate2 threatens the “mother of all public
goods”. (Nordhaus 2008: 62) Yet, since there is no simple coincidence between the
descriptive and the normative, we face major difficulties in translating knowledge into an
effective global agenda. Having a grip on the facts does not tell us what should be done.
James Garvey summarizes the complexity of the situation when he writes: “The spatial and
temporal smearing of actions and agency can be deeply confusing, because sometimes moral
responsibility depends conceptually on another sort of responsibility: causal responsibility…
We lack both the wisdom and the theory to cope with [global warming]. It’s possible… that
our theoretical failure can lead to a moral failure, a kind of deception in which we focus on
one part of the problem and not others. The complexity can be an excuse, a problematic
excuse, for doing nothing at all”. (Garvey 2008: 61) Indeed, the broad scientific consensus
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over global warming has not been matched by a shared commitment at the political level to
find solutions founded on the universal human interest.
The universal dimension of the crisis, a word whose etymology implies that we are
facing a historical moment of decision, requires that we pay careful attention to the different
issues raised by climate change. The aim of this article is to contribute to the theoretical
debate by focusing on the issue of distributional justice among states and social classes.
Nation states have varying capabilities and different historical responsibilities in the process
of global warming, a reality that derives from their historical pattern of insertion at the centre
or periphery of the global political economy, with implications regarding burden sharing. At
the same time, given the rise of a large class of consumers in “emerging countries”, a serious
appraisal must imperatively distinguish between social classes. The purpose of new
theorising is to find ways to overcome the contradiction between global human needs and the
presently reality of the segmentation of the international system into discreet national units.
To discuss these issues we have chosen to take the cases of the United States and China, the
two largest emitters the actions or non-actions of which will largely determine global
outcomes. The question is how trust-building mechanisms could be developed that would
lead to effective cooperation allowing states to break out of the prisoners’ dilemma they
otherwise face, and move forward towards a global project of protection of the atmospheric
commons.
The first part of this paper is devoted to structural aspects of the decision-making
framework generated by American and Chinese GHG emissions. The second part examines
fundamental debates concerning burden sharing between the US and China in global
warming mitigation. The third deals with the intellectual and normative challenge to imagine
new forms of ordered pluralist cooperation leading to convergence around common agendas
that are in the overall human interest.
I. The Trap
There is a significant difference between knowing that something should be done and
knowing what must be done. In the case of global warming, this difficulty is not only linked
to technological challenges that are real and perhaps not solvable, but also to the problems
raised by existing decision-making frameworks. There is a manifest contradiction between
the understanding that survival in the long run depends on stopping the present course of
climate change and the utility maximising logic of homo economicus. The available scientific
data leads to the inescapable conclusion that there is an overwhelming common interest to act
today. Yet, at the same time, aiming to maximize short-term benefits, individual agents have
an interest in continuing voracious consumption of fossil fuels and other natural resources.
The logic of homo economicus, leads all actors – states, firms or individual citizens, rich and
poor people alike – to being unreasonable at the deepest level of reason. Economists call this
a “prisoner’s dilemma” (PD). In the case of global warming, this dilemma is made
particularly acute by three specificities: first, it concerns a “common resource”, second it is
both intra and intergenerational, and, third, it involves different categories of nation-states
with different historical responsibilities in global warming, including newly industrialised
countries such as China.
A. Public Goods
The common resource endangered by global warming is the carbon-absorbing properties of
the planet, properties that are sometimes called “carbon sinks”. In what way are these carbon
sinks a common resource?
Goods can be classified according two attributes: whether they are excludable (people
can be excluded from consuming them) and whether they are rival (one person’s
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consumption of a considered good reduces the amount available to other consumers). Private
goods (cars, oranges…) are both excludable and rival. Public goods, on the other hand, are
goods that are non-excludable (nobody can be excluded from consuming them) and non-rival
(the consumption of one unit of such a good does not diminish another agent’s possibility to
consume it). Some public goods such as sunshine are produced by nature and virtually
imperishable (at least on a human time scale). Others are man made, for instance national
defence or lighthouses. If private goods can be efficiently produced and consumed on a
competitive market, this is not the case for public goods. Because of the lack of financial
incentives to produce them or to pay for their consumption (a free-rider problem) they must
be provided by government and paid for with taxes.
There is a large spectrum of goods between purely private and purely public goods.
These in-between cases - sometimes called “impure” public goods (Stiglitz 1999) - belong
either to the category of “club goods” if they are exclusive but non-rival (coded TV
broadcast…) or to the category of “common resources” (or simply “commons”) if they are
non-exclusive but rival (fish stocks...). The climate can be considered as a pure natural public
good or, to be more precise, it was a pure natural global public good prior to the ability of
human beings to modify it. Since the end of the eighteenth century, when humanity became a
kind of geophysical force (Vernadsky) and the planet entered in a new age that Will Steffen,
Paul Crutzen and John McNeill call the “Anthropocene” (Steffen, Crutzen, McNeill 2007),
the earth’s climate has gradually became a global public good that has, in part, to be created
by human beings. Of course, what has to be created is not the earth climate in se but earth
climate stability. (Traxler 2002: 120) Put differently, climate stability is no longer a “pure
natural public good”, nor a “pure artificial public good”. It is partially both. It is a “global
common” or, to be more precise, “carbon sinks” are global common resources. The rise of
earth temperatures - that can be defined as a “public bad” (Samuelson & Nordhaus 1985:
713) - is the result of an overuse by some economic agents (states, producers, consumers…)
of the carbon absorbing capacities of the planet.
Left to market mechanisms alone, common resources suffer from overuse. A
consumer can freely deplete the available amount of commons. This is what Garrett Hardin in
a famous article called the “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968). Thus, it can be said
that the carbon-absorbing properties of the planet is a common resource and that GHG
emissions are a form of appropriation of this common resource. The overuse of carbon sinks
can be analysed as a possible payoff of a prisoners’ dilemma. The prisoners’ dilemma
generated by global warming is both intra and intergenerational.
B. An Intra and Intergenerational Prisoners’ Dilemma
The intragenerational aspect of the dilemma can be expressed the following way:
“(PD1) It is collectively rational to cooperate and restrict overall pollution: each agent
prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting their individual pollution over the
outcome produced by no one doing so.
(PD2) It is individually rational not to restrict one’s own pollution: when each agent
has the power to decide whether or not she will restrict her pollution, each (rationally) prefers
not to do so, whatever the others do”. (Gardiner 2006: 400)
This is a good example of the traditional prisoners’ dilemma. In the real world it could
be resolved when the parties involved benefit from a wider context of interaction, that is to
say when reciprocity or mutually beneficial decisions play an important role. Trade and
security are good examples of such a situation. That is why Joseph Stiglitz has proposed to
use trade sanctions as a mean of enforcing the U.S.‘ participation in the Kyoto Protocol. In
2006, Stiglitz wrote: “Fortunately we have an international trade framework that can be used
to force states that inflict harm to others to behave in a better fashion. Except in certain
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limited situations (like agriculture) the WTO [World Trade Organization] does not allow
subsidies — obviously, if some country subsidizes its firms, the playing field is not level…
Not paying the cost of damage to the environment is a subsidy, just as not paying the full
costs of worker would be. In most of the developed countries of the world today, firms are
paying the cost of pollution to the global environment, in the form of taxes imposed on coal,
oil, and gas. But American firms are being subsidized — and massively so. There is a simple
remedy: others should prohibit the importation of American goods produced using energy
intensive technologies, or, at least impose a high tax on them, to offset the subsidy that those
goods currently are receiving”. (Stiglitz 2006: 2)
A slightly different line of reasoning leads to very similar conclusions. Game theory
teaches us that to progress from rivalry to cooperation there is no need for friendship
(fortunately: if there were, we should consider moving at once to another planet!) but only
interaction taking place over time. (Axelrod 1984) To put it more precisely, sustainable
relations between players may generate cooperation. Who could deny that negotiations on
climate control are an example of this kind of situation? But there is always the possibility of
tit for tat: one player failing to attend might push others into retaliating by staying away. This
outcome would, in the case of climate negotiations, be a recipe for disaster.
A disaster could also result from the intergenerational dimension of the prisoners’
dilemma. The risk linked to this temporal characteristic appears clearly when we consider a
“pure” version of the intergenerational problem, that is to say a case where different
generations do not overlap. This “Pure Intergenerational Problem” (PIP) can be expressed as
follows:
“(PIP1) It is collectively rational for most generations to cooperate, (almost) every
generation prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting pollution over the outcome
produced by everyone over polluting.
(PIP2) It is individually rational for all generations not to cooperate: when each
generation has the power to decide whether or not it will over pollute, each generation
(rationally) prefers to over pollute, whatever the others do”. (Gardiner 2006: 404)
This second trap (PIP) is worse than the first (PD).
PIP1 is worse than PD1 because the first generation is not taken into account in the
logical process. Thus, the first generation has no incentive to act and this inaction has a
domino effect on subsequent generations, an effect that undermines the possibility of a
collective project of compliance. PIP2 is worse than PD2 because, since the different
generations do not coexist, they are unable to influence each other’s behaviour through the
building of institutions setting binding norms.
PIP is thus more difficult to resolve than the PD “because the standard solution to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma are unavailable: one cannot appeal to a wider context of mutually
beneficial interaction, nor to the usual notion of reciprocity”. (Gardiner 2006: 405)
C. The Challenge of Emerging Countries
The dilemma has been sharpened during the last few decades by the impressive economic
growth of some newly industrialized or re-industralizing countries. China is the perfect
example of this new situation.
Some figures give a very precise idea of the problems that are before us.
In 1970, total greenhouse gas emissions were 23.9 GtCO2eq. The share of the “BRIC
countries” (Brazil, Russia, India, China) was 5.9 (i.e. 24.6%) and the share of the OECD
counties was 13.7 (i.e. 57.3%). In 2005, total greenhouse gas emissions were 46.9 GtCO2eq.
The share of the BRIC countries was 16.1 (i.e. 34.3%) and the share of the OECD countries
was 18.7 (i.e. 39.8%). If no new policy actions are taken, in other words if we follow a
business as usual scenario, global greenhouse gas emissions are projected to reach 71.4
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GtCO2eq in 2050. The share of the BRIC countries will reach 26.2 (i.e. 36.6%), 23.5 (i.e.
32.9%) for the OECD countries (see Table 1).
Table 1

Emissions of all anthropogenic gases. Baseline (figures in GtCO2eq)
Group
1970
2005
2050
OECD
13.7
18.7
23.5
BRIC
5.9
16.1
26.2
ROW
4.3
12.1
21.7
Total baseline
23.9
46.9
71.4
Source : OECD (2008), OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030, Paris: OECD, p. 25

In 1980, Chinese emissions of CO2 were about 1.5 billion tons, the emission per
capita being 1.5 ton. That same year, the American figures were respectively 4.8 billion and
21. In 1990 these figures were 2.3 billion and 2 for China against 4.8 billion and 20 for the
United States. In 2005 they were more than 5 billion and 4 for China against nearly 6 billion
and 20 for the United States. In 2006, the trends curves crossed (see Table 2). According to a
report published by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency in 2008, overall
Chinese emissions in 2006 were 7% above the US emissions, 14% above in 2007. (Rosenthal
2008)
Forecasts by the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicate that the increase in
China’s emissions of CO2 between now and 2030 — 4 additional gigatons (Gt) — would by
itself constitute 40% of all additional emissions by all the world’s countries and nearly double
those of the old industrialized countries. (IEA 2006: 188)
Such a situation raises a very difficult ethical question. China’s right, as well as the
right of all other “emerging” countries to economic growth and development cannot be put
into question. But how can this entirely legitimate right to economic development be
guaranteed without nullifying international efforts to limit GHG emissions? What is more,
the effects caused by the size and populations of these countries make it impossible for us to
argue solely in relative terms. The fact that each American emits on average 4.3 times more
CO2 per annum than a Chinese person cannot in any way lead us to conclude that, in the
interest of “justice”, no measures for controlling Chinese emissions should be taken so long
as Chinese individual emissions lag behind American ones. Indeed, if individual emissions in
China reached levels comparable to those in America, one can easily imagine the state that
the world climate would be in.
Table 2

Global* and per capita** US and Chinese CO2 emission between 1980 and 2006
1980
1990
2000
2005
2006
United
Global
4,788
5,028
5,860
5,994
5,902
States
emission
Emission
21.0
20.1
20.8
20.3
19.8
per capita
China
Global
1,460
2,293
2,966
5,429
6,017
emission
Emission
1.5
2.0
2.3
4.1
4.6
per capita
10.0
9.0
4.9
4.3
US emission per capita / 14.0
Chinese emission per
capita
* Expressed in million metric tons of carbon dioxide. ** Expressed in metric tons of carbon dioxide.
Source: website of the Energy Information Administration (EIA). Official Energy Statistics from the U.S.
Government
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Yet another element makes the situation even more complex: the countries which have
(on average) the biggest ecological footprint have also the highest HDI (Human Development
Index). And those which have the highest HDI have also (always on average) the highest
GDP per capita. (Table 3)
Table 3

CO2
Combined
Life
CO2
Human
Number GDP
Share
gross
expectancy
Development
of
per
emissions
emissions
of
enrolment (Mt CO2) world
at birth
Index
countries capita
per
ratio for
(years)
capita
(PP
2004
total*
primary,
2005
(t CO2)
US$)
(%)
secondary
2005
2004
2004
and
tertiary
education
(%)
2005
High human
70
23,986
76.2
88.4
16,616
57
10.1
development
1 ≥ HDI ≥
0.8
85
4,876
67.5
65.3
10,215
35
2.5
Medium
human
development
0.8 > HDI ≥
0.5
22
1,112
48.5
45.8
162
1
0.3
Low human
development
0.5 > HDI ≥
0
World
177
9,543
68.1
67.8
28,983
100*
4.5
*The world total includes carbon dioxide emissions not included in national totals. These emissions
amount to approximately 5% of the world total.
Source: UNDP (2007), Human Development Report 2007/2008, p. 69, 232.

Similar comparisons can be made between the United States and China (Table 4).
Table 4

United
States
China

HDI

GDP
per
capita
(PPP
US$)
2005

0.951

41,890

0.777

6,757

CO2
Life
Combined
expectancy
gross
emissions
at birth
enrolment (Mt CO2)
(year)
ratio for
2004
2005
primary,
secondary
and
tertiary
education
(%)
2005
77.9
93.3
6.046
72,5

69.1

5.007

Source: UNDP (2007), Human Development Report 2007/2008, p. 69, 232.
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Share
of
world
total
(%)
2004

CO2
emissions
per
capita
(t CO2)
2004

20.9

20.6

17.3

3.8

Jean Gadrey has highlighted a strong linear correlation between CO2 emissions per
capita and GDP per capita. Up to 13,000 US dollars per capita, when GDP per capita
increases by 3,000 dollars, GHG emissions increase by 1 ton. After 13,000 dollars (only 36
countries in the world, out of 177 ranked by the UNDP), this relation weakens. (Gadrey 2008:
70) To get a simple idea of the margin of progress that can be achieved by the United States,
it is useful to have in mind examples such as Japan, which has an HDI of 0.953 and a CO2
emission per capita of 9.9 tons or France where these two figures are respectively 0.952 and
6.
Notwithstanding the problems discussed above, the target humanity has to reach is
clear. If we want to avoid what the OECD calls “dangerous” climate change, the rise of the
earth’s temperature must not exceed 2°C during this century. Above this threshold, the risk of
“large-scale human development setbacks and irreversible ecological catastrophes will
increase sharply”. (UNDP 2007: 7) However, if we want to limit the temperature increase to
2°C above the pre-industrial level, the GHG concentration must not exceed 450 ppm (as we
noted above, this concentration has risen from 280 to 379 over the past 100 years). At 450
ppm the probability to stay beneath 2°C is 50%. At 550 ppm this figures shrinks to 20%. To
fulfil the objective, the carbon budget for the whole twenty first century must be limited to
1,456 GtCO2, that is to say 14.5 GtCO2 per year. (UNDP 2007: 46) This figure must be
compared to our present annual emissions: 28.9 GtCO2! Table 3.)
A number of scenarios have been suggested. The UNDP has identified a pathway to
keep the planet under the 2°C threshold. World emissions, after a peak around 2020, would
have to decline by 50% by 2050 (from a 1990 base-year) and fall toward zero in net terms by
the end of the century. Of course, the burden of such a mitigation strategy must be equitably
shared between countries of different development levels. That is why the UNDP
distinguishes two groups of counties: industrialized and developing. The first would have to
target an emissions peak around 2012, then a 30% cut by 2020 and 80% by 2050. In the
second group there would be of course large variations. Major emitters would maintain a
trajectory of rising emissions to 2020, peaking at around 80% above current levels, with cuts
of 20% as compared to 1990 levels by 2050. (UNDP 2007: 48) These goals are very
ambitious and are based on the assumption that there is a universal obligation to avoid
negative outcomes. They require imagining “efficient policies”, that is to say policies that
permit to reach these objectives (the 2°C threshold needn’t be justified here3) at the lowest
possible costs. This question is however inextricably linked to the question of the burden
sharing rules.
II. Burden Sharing Rules
Climate stability being a common resource, collective action is needed to preserve or, in a
certain sense, to create it. Reduction and adaptation measures are thus required. Reduction (or
“abatement” or “mitigation”) means the curbing of GHG emissions and adaptation means a
set of actions designed to prepare humanity to meet the challenges of the rise of the
temperatures that is, whatever is decided, underway. If the ecological necessity to act is
obvious, this requirement is as we have seen above linked to the aim of improving human
development. In other words, the new climate regime that has to be conceived and
implemented must place the right to development at its core. Collective choices and
commitments must therefore be taken at the world level.
3

As it seems to exist a consensus (or at least an « near-consensus ») on this figure and on the pathway of GHG
emissions reduction the world has to follow, we will not discuss here what William Nordhaus for instance call
the « when efficiency requirement », that is to say the level of the rate of social time preference that must be
applied to the cost-benefit analysis. (Nordhaus 2008) The likelihood of a “dangerous” climate change if the rise
of temperature should exceed 2°C seems great enough to justify action.
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The UNFCCC aptly summarizes some of the major challenges that are (still) before
us when it underlines that “the global nature of climate change call for the widest possible
cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate
international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated capabilities and
their social and economic conditions”. The problem to solve is thus a question of distributive
justice concerning the use of carbon sinks or, to put it differently, a problem of sharing the
world’s carbon budget in a way that will avoid an increase of temperature superior to 2°C in
the next 100 years. As James Garvey underlines it: “The carbon sinks of our world are a finite
resource which has been shared out unequally. Justice demands that we redress the balance”.
(Garvey 2008: 76)
A. The “Relevant Agents” Question
In the climate regime to come it will thus be necessary to define an acceptable regime of
burden sharing among economic agents. But, who are the relevant agents? To put it
differently: “Who is obligated to act and to aid?” (Harris 2008: 482) Traditionally, the
answer has been “the nation state”. In the debate on burden sharing rules, arguments are
frequently based on aggregate emissions per state and emission per capita in a given state. All
comparisons between states or between individuals take nation-states as the unit and building
block of the reasoning. This state-centric approach has a perverse effect since it masks
emissions differentials within states among social classes. As Paul Harris argues, many of the
solutions to climate change will, of course, have to involve states. “But this reality needs not
absolve capable individuals from explicit responsibility and obligation, especially when states
are not doing nearly enough”. (Harris 2008: 483) He rightly asks: “Why should a poor person
in, say, Germany be lumped with the wealthy of Germany to aid both the poor and the rich in
China or other developing countries who suffer from the effects of climate change, especially
when the latter pollute far more?” (Harris 2008: 484) The question is not simply theoretical,
the Indian and Chinese middle classes being more numerous than the German population.
Any answer must thus address both levels. The state-centred approach must lead to an
international climate justice framework with enforced national obligations. The social class or
citizen centred answer requires a cosmopolitan or rather global climate justice framework
with individual obligations.
B. International Climate Justice
The principle of states’ obligations is the foundation of the international climate justice
approach. But how should we define the “obligations” of any particular state? At least two
criteria can be taken into consideration: the historical responsibilities of the state considered
and its present (economic, technological…) capacities to contribute to its mitigation.
Concerning the first point, is it useful to stress that some states have contributed far
more than others to the present rises of earth temperatures? In fact, the disparities in current
levels of GHG emissions reflect the disparities in cumulative emissions since the industrial
revolution. The United States, for instance, which is the first per capita emitter of the planet
and until 2006 was the first emitting country, is responsible for almost 30% of cumulative
CO2 emissions between 1850 and 2002. The European Union ranks second with 26.5% and
Russia third with 8.1%. From 1850 till now, the “developed” world has been responsible for
76% of CO2 emissions, a figure that means that the responsibility of the “developing” world
is limited to 24%. (Garvey 2008: 70) These figures clearly show that some countries have
overused the carbon sinks of the Earth. Second, it is also obvious that the industrialized states
have greater financial and technological capacities to develop climate friendly technologies
or at least more energy efficient technologies.
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Burden sharing principles must thus be adopted. But, what makes such a decision
difficult to take is that there are different kinds of rules that rely on different moral
justifications. Martino Traxler, for instance, proposes an interesting typology that
distinguishes between “just” and “fair” principles. Just principles are “backward looking”
“historical rectificatory principles” that are “intended to restore an acceptable moral order
that past actions had disturbed”. Examples of “just” proposals could be: 1. to pay or
contribute in proportion to the benefits received from the total historical emissions of GHGs;
2. to pay in proportion to the total historical emissions of GHGs; 3. to pay in proportion to
responsibility, the responsibility being for instance limited to emissions after a given year of
reference, for example 1990. (As a matter of fact, in the field of pollution, nobody can be
held responsible for a damage caused at a period when science had not evidenced such
damage. That is why the year of the publication of the first IPCC can be considered an
acceptable starting point). Fair principles are “forward looking”. They “seek to maintain
matters at least as morally acceptable as they are found to be at present in the future”. An
example of a “fair” proposal is to pay on an equal per capita basis.4 (Traxler 2002: 117-131)
In this perspective, the Kyoto Protocol is both unjust (because some developing countries like
China are in the Annexe 2 even though they will soon contribute to global warming far more
than many developed countries) and unfair in the sense that these developing countries are
not bound to emissions reduction.
Paul Baer, Tom Athanasious, Sivan Kartha and Eric Kemp-Benedict - authors of The
Greenhouse Development Rights Framework - propose a “Responsibility Capacity Index”
(RCI) to calculate national climate obligations. First, they fix a “development threshold”, that
is to say a level income (7,500 dollars per capita and per year, in purchasing power parity
(PPP) at which people achieve acceptable levels of the Millennium Development Goals
indicators. On this basis, a nation’s capacity is the sum of all individual incomes above the
threshold. Its responsibility is likewise defined as cumulative emissions since 1990,
excluding emissions that correspond to consumption below the development threshold. These
measures can be combined in the “Responsibility Capacity Index”. (Baer et al. 2008)
With a RCI = aR + bC (with a = b = 0.5) we obtain the following figures (Table 5) :
Table 5

Greenhouse Development Rights Framework for United States and China
2010
2020
2030
Capacity Responsibility RCI (% RCI (% RCI (%
Population GDP
of
of
(% of global) of
(% of
per
(% of
global)
global)
global)
global)
capita
global)
($ US
PPP)
United
4.5
45,640
29.7
36.4
33.1
29.1
25.5
States
China
19.7
5,899
5.8
5.2
5.5
10.4
15.2
World
100
9,929
100
100
100
100
100
Source: from Baer et al. (2008), The Greenhouse Development Right Framework, Heinrich Böll
Foundation, Christian Aid, Ecoequity and the Stockholm Environment Institute, p. 55.

4

It is not useless to note that in 2004 the CO2 world emissions per capita is 4.5 tons. A figure to compare to the
Chinese figure: 3.8 tons and to the American one: 20.6 tons. These figures are obtained with a world total
emission of almost 29 gigatons. With the annual budget of 14.5 gigatons cited above, these figures should (with
the same population) be reduced by 50%! We understand why Chinese authorities prefer “intensity targets”
(carbon intensity of economic growth, energy intensity of the economy…) to “absolute targets”. For a critique
of a contribution on equal per capita basis, see Traxler (2002: 124 -125).
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It must be noted that because the measure of capacity excludes the income of poor
people, a rich country’s capacity will be larger in percentage terms than its share of global
income, and a poor country’s capacity will be smaller. In the same way, a wealthy country’s
responsibility will be larger than its share of cumulative emissions because fewer of its
historical emissions will be excluded. If we assume that the total cost of the global climate
program is 1% of gross world product, or about 1 trillion dollars in 2020, we obtain the
following estimates of obligation to pay (for mitigation and adaptation) (Table 65). (If one
believes that the cost will be 2%, then one should multiply by 2 the last two columns.)
Table 6

United States
China
World

National
income
(billion $)
18,177
13,439
94,405

National obligations to pay
National
National
capacity (%
capacity
GDP)
(billion $)
15,661
86.2%
5,932
44.1%
59,388
62.9%

National
obligation
(billion $)
275
98
944

National
obligation (%
GDP)
1.51%
0.73%
1.00%

Source: from Baer et al. (2008), The Greenhouse Development Right Framework, Heinrich Böll
Foundation, Christian Aid, Ecoequity and the Stockholm Environment Institute, p. 58.

Even if these figures seem huge, they must be considered in a perspective of
economic growth. As Christian Azar and Stephen Schneider demonstrate, the abatement cost
of global warming would be overtaken after a few years of income growth. “If the cost by the
year 2100 is as high as 6% of global GDP and income growth is 2% per year, then the delay
time is 3 years, whereas as the delay time is only 1 year if income grows by 3% per year and
the abatement cost is 3% of GDP.” (Azar and Schneider 2002: 77) If you rank countries
according their average obligation per person above the development threshold, it appears
that 17 of the top 40 countries are not countries included in the Annex 1 of the Kyoto
protocol. (Baer et al. 2008: 62) But states are not the only relevant actors obligated to act.
What about affluent people, whatever their nationality? Taking this question into
consideration leads to the concept of cosmopolitan climate justice.
C. Cosmopolitan Climate Justice
As Paul Harris argues, the cosmopolitan conception of justice points to individuals as global
citizens of one world. “A cosmopolitan approach places rights and obligations at the
individual level, discounting the importance of national boundaries”. (Harris 2008: 486) In
such a perspective, national boundaries are not considered as a morally distinctive feature for
the elaboration of burden sharing rules. The cosmopolitan conception of justice can thus be
seen as an application, at the international level, of John Rawls’ veil of ignorance. As
Charles Beitz puts it: “For purpose of moral choice, we must… regard the world from the
perspective of an original position from which matters of national citizenship are excluded by
an extended veil of ignorance”. (Beitz 1979: 176) But, why should such a shift from
international to cosmopolitan justice be considered so important?
The answer is quite simple: in “emerging” countries a growing number of people
enjoy a middle-class lifestyle in terms of consumption patterns. (Myers & Kent 2004) The
first methodological step to grasp the importance of this new class of consumers is, in order
to compare national economies on a robust basis, to express their GNP (gross national
product) or GNI (gross national income) not in conventional or international-exchange
5

Explanation : the figure 275 billion dollars for the United States (column 5) is obtained the following way:
944.05 x 0.291 (from Table 5 column 7) = 274,7. (944.05 is 1% of world GDP)
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dollars but in “purchasing power parity” (PPP). Using PPP provides an indicator of
wellbeing that is free of exchange rates distortions. This leads to sometimes substantial
modifications in country rankings. (Table 7). (In 2007, expressed in current dollars, US GDP
was $13,886 billion and China GDP was $31,121 billion. The indications of Table 7 are thus
still, not to say more than ever, valid.)
Table 7

United States
China
World

Two of the world’s largest economies in 2002
$, billions
Rank
PPP $, billions
10,138
1
10,138
1,237
6
5,732
32,253
47,426

Rank
1
2

Source: from Myers & Kent (2004), The New Consumers. The Influence of Affluence on the Environment,
Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press, p. 9.

The “new consumers” can be defined as “people within an average four-member
households who possess purchasing power of at least PPP$10,000 per year, or at least
PPP$2,500 per person”. (Myers & Kent 2004: 8) These new consumers being more and more
numerous, a new category of nations has progressively emerged that can be called: the “new
consumer-countries”. If we limit this group to the countries that have had vigorous economic
growth in recent years and a population of at least 20 million people, we obtain a set of 20
countries, headed by China (Table 8). This is unsurprising since between 1978 and 2003, the
country has multiplied its GNP by almost 7 and its real income per capita by almost 5.
(Maddison 2007: 69) To limit ourselves to one example (for a detailed presentation of the
situation, see Huchet & Maréchal 2007), the Chinese car fleet rose from 1.6 million in 1990
(152 million in the United States) to 8 million in 2000 (175 million in the United States, this
figure including SUVs), and was expected (in 2004 by Myers & Kent) to exceed 40 million
by 2010, that is to say to equal the German fleet. In fact, in 2007, there were 53 million cars
on the Chinese roads! In short, China’s “ecological footprint” is rising rapidly. Both the
United States and China have now an ecological deficit. (Myers & Kent 2004: 60) Whatever
the economic instrument chosen in the next years (tradable emission permits or carbon tax)
negotiations are going to be difficult and potentially conflict ridden between “developed” and
“developing” countries.
Table 8

The New Chinese and Indian Consumers in 2000
Population
Per-capita
Per-capita
New
(millions)
GNI ($)
GNI (PPP$)
consumers
(millions and
% of
population)

China
India
Totals of the
20 counties
ranked

1262
1016
3632

840
450
xx

3920
2340
xx

New
consumers’
purchasing
power
(PPP$
billions and
% of national
total)
303 (24)
1267 (52)
132 (13)
609 (39)
1059 (29)
6305 (67)

Source: from Myers & Kent (2004), The New Consumers. The Influence of Affluence on the Environment,
Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press, p. 17.
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III. Ordered Pluralist Cooperation
Because of its global scope, the first crisis of its kind in recorded history, global warming
poses an acute practical and normative challenge for political philosophy in general and
international relations theory in particular. It follows from what has been said that the
normatively best approach to solving global warming would be based on a holistic
assumption of species and eco-systemic unity, or universal interdependence transcending
national and cultural distinctions. This in turn implies the inalienable right of all individuals,
present and future, to a “good life”, that is a life worth living “with and for others under just
institutions”. (Ricœur 1990: 202) In a cosmopolitan setting, the distributional issues raised by
the need to offset global warming would translate as a problem of social justice among
individuals and social classes at the global level rather than simply between nation states.
This in turn assumes the need for empowered institutions of global governance, the purpose
of which would be to define and implement universal public policies designed to secure inter
and intra generational equity. In the pursuit of this normative goal, theory should be geared
towards generating a cosmopolitan ethos and shared inter-subjective meanings regarding the
human prospect that are based on solidarity.
The difficulties of implementation of such a cosmopolitan perspective are however
enormous. It presupposes the passage from the modern or Westphalian inter-national system,
which is segmented into sovereign national territorial units, to a post-modern configuration of
post-nationality. Yet, the imagined communities (Anderson 1991) we live in and have
constructed since the rise of the modern nation state are based on ontological assumptions
about identity, belonging and obligations that cannot be simply swept away by new scientific
facts (this is another way of saying what we affirmed earlier regarding descriptive and
normative judgments). National, religious and indeed racial segmentation remain stubborn if
often unfortunate social facts. Despite deepened transnational linkages at various levels, we
are still very far from the post-international and post-national politics envisioned by some
political theorists in the aftermath of the Cold War (Rosenau 1992; Habermas 1996). Even if
we assume that a shared understanding is indeed gradually emerging that the collective
human fate is inescapably bound to finding global answers to transnational problems, the
abstract understanding of shared humanity (species being, in Marx’ formulation6) does not
automatically translate into a cosmopolitan ethos since it runs counter to daily experience of
difference, otherness and self-interest (however flawed these can be shown to be). Likewise,
even if we are able to rid ourselves, individually and collectively, of philosophies of radical
selfishness (homo economicus) this does not mean that they will spontaneously give way to
empathy towards “strangers”, much less universal altruism. Moreover, while the statement
“we are all likely to die or at least to suffer extremely deleterious consequences if we don’t
share the burden of global warming” is certainly accurate, it does not tell us how in fact
various nations and social classes should share it, or who will define the terms of the
settlement. Lastly, even assuming that global institutions can be created to find ways out of
our present collective predicament, how to we ensure that they will be just?
A. Partial Cosmopolitanism
These are extremely difficult problems to resolve. Perhaps the best way out of contradiction
is to reject options that are either undesirable or unattainable. The first undesirable outcome
would be a sharpening of international segmentation through an exacerbation of struggles
over scare resources, an outcome predicted by realist and neo-realist international relations
theory. Still dominant in the contemporary literature, neo-realism postulates that nation-states
6

Indeed, one can argue that global warming confronts individuals to the existential reality of species-being, in
the sense given to that concept by Marx. See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, New
York: International Publishers, 1973.

234

are functionally undifferentiated self-seeking units that are conditioned by structural anarchy
to maximise their power and minimise their insecurity, to the exclusion of all else. Under
conditions of eco-systemic crisis, this Hobbesian assumption, which has been subjected to
powerful critique,7 implies a sharpening of interstate conflict. Said otherwise, realism and
neo-realism have to be rejected outright if there is any hope of solving the greatest challenge
humanity has as yet faced. However, as Richard Falk has rightly pointed out, we also have to
exclude a number of “post-Westphalian scenarios” as either undesirable or unattainable or
both, among them the notion of a self-regulating global market system, the limits of which
are now plainly apparent, or the idea of a world government. (Falk 2004) If it were possible,
which it is not, world government would erase pluralism and is not synonymous with
democratic global governance. A world Leviathan would more likely reproduce at global
level, under highly coercive circumstances, the social inequalities that presently exist within
national boundaries, than establish global justice.
Having rejected a priori both interstate anarchy and these two post-Westphalian
scenarios, what options are we left with? Falk points to a solution when he calls for the
“gradual emergence of an accountable global polity” (Falk 2004: 9) To be legitimate, that
global polity would be inclusive, democratic, pluralistic and founded on human solidarity. In
a similar vein, Mireille Delmas-Marty has suggested that the alternative to the chaos of
interstate rivalry or to hegemonic rule by a single world state or a world empire would be for
the international system to move incrementally towards “ordered pluralist cooperation”.
(Delmas-Marty 2006) The concept of ordered pluralist cooperation implies the gradual
convergence of actor agendas around common goals across different issue areas. Rather than
erasing pluralism, it would seek to identify areas of convergence that allow for cooperative
action in a pluralistic setting, successful cooperation in any one area generating trust and
opening the possibility for advances in other areas. In contrast to hegemonic regimes, the
rules and disciplines of which are set by a dominant power, ordered pluralism would not be
based on hierarchy but on the mutual needs of various actors with different capabilities (the
European Union being at political level a good heuristic example of a non-hegemonic ordered
plural system). In other words, we should eschew attempting to achieve an unattainable
complete cosmopolitan order but rather imagine the frameworks that would allow movement
towards convergence, that is a partial cosmopolitanism that does not erase plural traditions
and identities. (Appiah 2007) We can apply these concepts to the question of global warming
by identifying areas of congruence between national and universal interests. In the case under
study, there is a real opportunity for the United States and China to set goals that meet mutual
needs, and by extension to secure the global atmospheric commons.
A very good concrete example of possible cooperation and convergence around
common goals is the proposal made by recently by Hu Angang, a senior figure of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, for a fair global settlement, taking into account “average greenhousegas emissions per capita, total greenhouse-gas emissions, [and] historical and current
responsibilities”. (Hu Angang, 2009) In Hu’s proposal, the Human Development Index (HDI)
of countries would serve as the metric of burden sharing rather than GDP. Thus, various
categories of countries – High (above 0.8), Medium High (between 0.65 and 0.8), Medium
Low (between 0.5 and 0.65), and Low HDI (under 0.5) – would contribute differentially to
the reduction of emissions. If all the largest polluters, which include both High HDI (the
“developed countries”) and Medium High HDI countries (such as China, HDI = 0.777) will
be required to make major efforts to cutback emissions, the High HDI countries, which owe
their present position of wealth and power to their historical position at the core of the
7

See for instance Richard Ashley’s and Robert Cox’ critiques in Robert Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its
Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
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hierarchical late modern world system, would be called upon to make the greatest
unconditional efforts not only in terms of emissions reduction but also in terms of providing
financial and/or technological assistance to the other groups of countries. This would help to
significantly mitigate climate warming while correcting the patterns of international
inequality set in the nineteenth century and that still shape the world today. Medium Low
HDI countries would “benefit from low-interest loans from international financial
organizations and low-cost technological assistance”. Obligations of various countries would
of course evolve according to their shifting position in the Human Development Index. Thus
Medium High HDI countries would become unconditional reducers once they have reached
High HDI status. The global effort would be enforced by a United Nations agency established
to that effect and which would set binding targets for all countries.
B. Convergence Around Norms
Global distributive justice would have to be complemented by fair social bargains at national
level. At the national level distributive justice in burden sharing would be accomplished
through redistributive policies such as progressive tax policies, incentives to invest in green
technologies, punishing disincentives for polluters, etc. In other words, the global bargain
would have to be sustained by domestic social democratic bargains based on a fair
distribution of resource consumption among social classes and a reorientation of patterns of
consumption to make that possible. A few years ago, proposals of this type would have
appeared hopelessly unrealistic since homo economicus was triumphant and the most
powerful state in the international system had abandoned cooperation and international law
and adopted policies of unilateral power maximisation policies. Today however, a new and
far more hopeful political configuration in the United States makes it possible to move
forward once again and to break out of the prisoners dilemma discussed in this article. In
spite of persisting competitive pressures, domestic and international, it is no longer
impossible to imagine convergence around shared understandings and norms. In that sense,
the present generation of world leaders have an immense historic responsibility since they
will define whether survival oriented outcomes will prevail or not. The responsibility is
however not theirs alone. There is a need to overcome the “theoretical ineptitude” discussed
at the outset. A concerted theoretical effort is required to generate the intellectual and
political conditions to make optimal outcomes possible. Theory is reflexive rather than
positive in the sense that the thinking subject is not separate from the object of thought but
plays a determining role in the constitution of the “real”. Along with historical actors,
theorists have the responsibility to help construct the cosmopolitan ethos that will underpin a
world order based on pluralist cooperation rather than rivalry.
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